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Abstract: We take an initial step in investigating the international diversification of Irish production
risk. We find evidence that Ireland displays some properties associated with international risk-
sharing. These include: high gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities; high international




penness to international capital flows promises myriad benefits. For a
country with strong growth potential, the ability to borrow overseas enables
it to converge more rapidly to its steady state. In addition, international
borrowing and lending can help stabilise an economy ex post in the face of
macroeconomic shocks. A third function is that international capital market
activity allows a country to hedge local production risk ex ante via cross-
ownership of equity stakes and an appropriately designed portfolio.
In this paper, we focus on the hedging role of international capital market
integration. We do so in the context of the recent history of the Irish economy.
The importance of foreign-owned firms in the Irish industrial sector; the rapidly
increasing level of overseas investment by indigenous firms; the substantial
external debt of the government; and the magnitudes of two-way portfolio capital38 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
flows suggest a profile of an economy that is heavily integrated into international
capital markets. Our focus here is on whether such integration has enabled
Ireland to hedge its macroeconomic risk.
Risk diversification promises significant benefits. First, by stabilising con-
sumption, the welfare of risk-averse agents is raised. Second, if firms face credit
constraints, then smooth cash flow is also beneficial in the corporate sector.
Third, diversification may give investors the insurance to undertake high-mean
high-variance projects, raising the economy’s long-run growth rate (see Acemoglu
and Zilibotti, 1997; Devereux and Saito, 1997; and Obstfeld 1994a).1
In studying the impact of international capital market integration, two
features make Ireland an especially interesting case study. First, Ireland has
relied heavily on external sources to finance domestic investment: the very large
current account deficits of the late 1970s and early 1980s now have their counter-
part in extraordinary trade balance surpluses (16-20 per cent during 1996-98)
and a large discrepancy between GDP and GNP (11-13 per cent during 1996-98).
Given the unusual macroeconomic significance of investment income flows in
the Irish economy, it is important to understand their cyclical behaviour. Second,
the composition of Ireland’s external liabilities is unusually skewed towards
FDI. As argued by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996), such equity-type liabilities
should provide better risk-sharing than debt-creating liabilities. The Irish economy
provides an environment in which this notion can be empirically investigated.
Previewing our results, we find evidence that is consistent with significant
international diversification. Indirect evidence is provided by significant levels
of international capital market activity; two-way international investment
income flows; and high international consumption correlations relative to inter-
national output correlations. Direct evidence is provided by the finding that the
yield on net foreign liabilities moves pro-cyclically. A pro-cyclical yield on net
foreign liabilities is attractive since it implies that GNP responds less than
proportionately to GDP shocks, with the result that national income is smoothed
in the face of output fluctuations.
In previous work, O’Malley and Scott (1987, 1994) related profit outflows to
the sales or turnover of foreign-owned domestic subsidiaries.2 Their focus was
on forecasting and so they did not attempt to isolate the cyclical component of
profit outflows. However, their finding of a significant positive relationship
between the level of firm activity (as proxied by sales or turnover) and the level
of profits in the foreign-owned sector is consistent with the evidence and
arguments advanced here. An earlier literature (Prachowny, 1969; Bond, 1977)
1. Devereux and Smith (1994) show that diversification in the presence of additive income
shocks (as opposed to multiplicative technology shocks) may lead to a fall in growth by reducing
the volume of precautionary savings.
2. In their 1994 paper, they also consider the exchange rate as an explanatory variable.IRISH DIVERSIFICATION 39
also studied the behaviour of international investment income flows. However,
the goal was to explain the levels of the rates of return on domestic and foreign
investments rather than their risk-diversification properties.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we review
some basic facts about Irish international capital market activity. Section III
investigates international consumption and output correlations. The cyclical
behaviour of the yield on net foreign liabilities is examined in Section IV. Section
V concludes.
II  BASIC FACTS
In this section, we first review the behaviour of various components of the
balance of payments before turning to other measures of international capital
market activity.
The Current Account and International Investment Income Flows
Table 1 and Figure 1 detail the evolution of the current account, the stock of
net foreign liabilities, international factor income flows (all expressed as ratios
to GDP) and the implied yield on net external liabilities over 1975-98. As shown
in Table 1, the ratio of the current account to GDP (CAY) severely deteriorated
during 1976-81 but has been improving since 1982 and moved into sustained
surplus in the early 1990s. Table 1 shows also shows the stock of net foreign
assets as a ratio to GDP (NFAY). We calculate this stock as the cumulative
current account deficit (in constant prices) since 1963.3 In line with the evolution
of the current account, the stock of net foreign assets has been persistently
negative but has been steadily improving since 1986.
The data for international factor income flows are shown in Table 1 and
graphed in Figure 1. The ratio of factor income outflows to GDP (INCMY ) has
been increasing over time, rising from 4.1 per cent in 1975 to a peak of 24.1 per
cent in 1997. The ratio of factor income inflows to GDP (INCPY) fluctuated
around a low level until 1986 but has significantly grown during 1987-98, more
than trebling from 3.4 per cent in 1986 to 10.5 per cent in 1998. These data
indicate that Ireland may continue to receive gross capital inflows but also has
accumulated a sizeable stock of gross foreign assets in recent years, reflecting
the overseas investment activities of domestic multinational corporations and
the greater international diversification of domestic investment institutions.
The net factor income flow (NFIY=INCPY–INCMY) became increasingly
negative during1975-85 but has since fluctuated with no clear trend. For
completeness, Figure 1 also shows the evolution of the ratio of GNP to GDP
(GNP/GDP=1+NFIY).
3. We would like to adjust this measure for revaluation effects, such as capital gains and losses,
but lack the data to make this correction.40 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Table 1: Irish International Investment Data
CAY  NFAY  INCMY  INCPY NFIY  R
1975 –1.43 –37.64 4.12 3.64 –0.48 1.28
1976 –5.00 –38.53 4.04 3.01 –1.03 2.68
1977 –5.13 –40.23 4.22 2.39 –1.84 4.57
1978 –6.32 –42.31 6.04 2.72 –3.32 7.85
1979 –12.57 –47.19 7.13 3.13 –4.00 8.47
1980 –10.73 –57.98 9.87 5.52 –4.35 7.50
1981 –13.65 –66.50 8.52 3.78 –4.74 7.13
1982 –9.60 –78.36 8.16 2.69 –5.47 6.99
1983 –6.06 –88.18 6.96 1.87 –5.08 5.76
1984 –5.59 –90.30 7.12 1.91 –5.21 5.77
1985 –3.77 –93.02 9.69 2.56 –7.14 7.67
1986 –3.22 –97.21 12.92 3.37 –9.56 9.83
1987 –0.22 –95.95 16.03 4.18 –11.84 12.34
1988 –0.03 –91.40 21.53 5.77 –15.76 17.25
1989 –1.57 –86.41 22.73 6.72 –16.01 18.53
1990 –0.76 –81.11 22.49 8.96 –13.53 16.68
1991 0.79 –80.23 18.69 7.75 –10.94 13.64
1992 1.10 –76.27 19.26 7.13 –12.13 15.90
1993 3.89 –72.91 17.41 6.01 –11.40 15.64
1994 2.80 –64.32 15.33 6.00 –9.33 14.51
1995 2.72 –55.37 19.64 8.07 –11.57 20.90
1996 2.75 –49.02 19.03 7.62 –11.41 23.27
1997 2.84 –42.14 24.12 10.44 –13.68 32.47
1998 3.71 –36.04 23.43 10.49 –12.94 35.91
Note: NFAY is ratio of the cumulative current account surplus to GDP. OUTFI and INFI
are ratios of international factor income outflows and inflows to GDP respectively.
NFIY=INFI-OUTFI. YIELD(R)=NFI/NFA.
Data Source: OECD Economic Outlook, December 1998.
 We also show the implied yield on the stock of net foreign liabilities in the






We employ net factor income as a proxy for net investment income, since the
OECD does not decompose factor income into payments to labour and capital.
Ideally, we would like to measure yields separately for the stocks of gross foreign
assets and liabilities but the Irish data are inadequate for this task. A perfect
measure of the rate of return would also include capital gains and losses on the
stocks of foreign assets and liabilities but data limitations preclude this step.
NFAt is the value of net foreign assets inherited from the previous year (NFAt=
NFAt-1+CAt-1).IRISH DIVERSIFICATION 41
Figure 1: GNP/GDP is Ratio of GNP to GDP.
See note to Table 1 for definitions of other variables.
We see from Table 1 that the yield has been rising throughout the period but
has sharply increased during the 1990s. On an accounting basis, this is explained
by the fact that net factor income flows have not significantly declined, despite
the contraction in the stock of net foreign liabilities. If foreign assets and liabilities
earned a similar, invariant rate of return, as in many textbook models, net
factor income would have declined in line with net external liabilities and no
increase in the net yield would have been observed. The pattern observed in the
Irish data, in contrast, suggests that foreign investments in Ireland have been
especially profitable in recent years.
Other Indicators of International Capital Market Integration
As a complement to the balance of payments data, we report some data on
Irish participation in international capital markets in Tables 2-4. Table 2 shows
the sum of international bonds raised by and bank loans issued to domestic
agents as a ratio to GDP (ICAPY) and the subcomponents (BONDY, LOANY). It
is clear that bond issues have grown in both absolute and relative importance,
indicating that Irish entities are increasingly able to tap the international
securities markets, reducing financing costs relative to exclusive dependence
on domestic bank loans.
Estimates of bilateral investment income flows between Ireland and the
United Kingdom over 1988-96 are provided in Table 3. The data indicate that
bilateral investment income inflows and outflows are in approximate balance.
1975-1998
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Table 2: International Capital Market Activity
ICAPY BONDY LOANY
1975 5.2 0.5 4.8
1976 5.9 0.7 5.2
1977 6.8 1 5.8
1978 7.1 0.8 6.3
1979 6 1.3 4.7
1980 2.7 1.3 1.4
1981 8.1 2.7 5.4
1982 7 3.1 3.9
1983 6.7 5.4 1.3
1984 6.9 4.8 2.1
1985 8.6 7.6 0.9
1986 10.6 8.5 2.1
1987 5.7 3.1 2.6
1988 3.1 1.7 1.4
1989 11.1 4.5 6.6
1990 6 2.2 3.8
1991 6.9 3.5 3.5
1992 5.4 4.3 1.1
1993 6 5.6 0.4
1994 10.5 4 6.5
1995 7.9 3.8 4.1
1996 10.8 9.1 1.7
1997 4.1 3.5 0.6
Notes: ICAPY is sum of international bond issues and loans. BONDY is total bond issues;
LOANY is total bank loans. All variables are expressed as ratios to GDP.
Source: OECD International Capital Markets Statistics, 1950-95 and OECD Financial
Statistics Monthly (January 1998).
A comparison of these figures to the aggregates in Table 1 indicates that the
United Kingdom is an important destination for Irish outward investment but
the United Kingdom plays a relatively smaller role as a source of inward
investment into Ireland. More detail is available for Irish-German bilateral
investment income flows (Table 4), which can be disaggregated into FDI, portfolio,
bond and loan income flows. It is clear from Table 4 that Germany is a net
recipient of investment income flows from Ireland but that the scale of the flows
are far smaller than between Ireland and the UK. In addition, the flows are
fairly evenly distributed across the different asset classes.
Finally, a partial source of information on bilateral direct investment patterns
between the US and Ireland is provided by the United States Bureau of Economic
Analysis which publishes data on the direct investment position of the US in
other countries and the direct investment position of other countries in the US.IRISH DIVERSIFICATION 43
According to the most recent estimates (Bargas, 1998), the value (at historical
cost) of the US direct investment position in Ireland was $10,198 million in
1996 and $14,476 million in 1997, or 14.8 per cent and 19.8 per cent of Irish
GDP respectively. However, the value of the Irish direct investment position in
the US is also extremely large, being $6,621 million in 1996 and $10,514 million
in 1997, or 9.6 per cent and 14.4 per cent of Irish GDP respectively.











Note: OUTFI and INFI are ratios of investment income inflows and outflows from UK
respectively, expressed as ratios to GDP.
Data Source: United Kingdom Balance of Payments “Pink Book” (1997) edition, Office of
National Statistics.
Table 4: Bilateral Investment Income Flows: Ireland and Germany
INCPY INCMY DIRPY DIRMY PORTPY
1993 0.87 2.34 0.06 0.85 0.25
1994 1.11 2.56 0.15 1.06 0.52
1995 1.06 2.25 0.09 0.68 0.47
1996 1.11 1.53 0.06 0.50 0.45
PORTMY BONDPY BONDMY LOANPY LOANMY
1993 0.75 0.24 0.66 0.55 0.73
1994 0.79 0.49 0.69 0.44 0.71
1995 0.72 0.45 0.65 0.50 0.85
1996 0.42 0.44 0.36 0.59 0.61
Note: INCPY and INCMY are investment income inflows and outflows from/to Germany.
DIRPY and DIRMY are income inflows/outflows associated with FDI positions; PORTPY
and PORTMY on portfolio investment positions; BONDPY and BONDMY on bond
investment positions; LOANPY and LOANMY on loan investment positions. All variables
are expressed as a ratio to GDP.
Data Source: Bundesbank, Balance of Payments by Region, Special Statistical Publication
11, September 1997.44 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
III  INTERNATIONAL CONSUMPTION AND OUTPUT CORRELATIONS
A basic prediction of international risk-sharing models is that consumption
should be more highly correlated across countries than output: countries should
share production risk in order to obtain a more stable path for consumption.4
Tables 5 and 6 report output and consumption correlations between Ireland
and various international groups of countries. In Table 5, we employ data from
the Penn World Tables version 5.6 in order to ensure that consumption and
output are measured in comparable terms across countries, at the cost of being
unable to extend the sample into the 1990s. Table 6 employs OECD data that
Table 5: International Consumption and Output Correlations I
1951-90 1951-72 1973-90
(1) Cor(C,Y) 0.717 0.758 0.678
(2) Cor(Y,YROW) 0.476 0.695 0.363
(3) Cor(C,CROW) 0.532 0.63 0.608
(4) Cor(Y,YEU15) 0.346 0.563 0.27
(5) Cor(C,CEU15) 0.408 0.439 0.511
(6) Cor(Y,YEU12) 0.35 0.571 0.281
(7) Cor(C,CEU12) 0.419 0.434 0.537
(8) Cor(Y,YEMU) 0.294 0.39 0.316
(9) Cor(C,CEMU) 0.237 0.087 0.481
(10) Cor(Y,YUK) 0.263 0.553 0.081
(11) Cor(C,CUK) 0.261 0.286 0.255
(12) Cor(Y,YUS) 0.366 0.458 0.266
(13) Cor(C,CUS) 0.353 0.37 0.336
Note: Correlations of log first differences of per capita consumption and output in constant
international dollars. ROW is a 40 country aggregate of all countries in Penn World
Tables version 5.6 with continuous data over 1950-90 of quality grade C- or higher. EU15
is the aggregate of the fifteen current members of the EU. EU12 is the aggregate of the
12 EU members prior to 1996. EMU is the aggregate of the eleven founding members of
EMU. UK and US denote United Kingdom and United States respectively.
4. See Obstfeld (1989, 1995), Backus et al. (1995) and Hess and Shin (1997) for reviews of this
literature. Of course, full risk-sharing is limited by enforcement problems, asymmetric information,
non-traded goods and non-tradable labour income risk. Even with complete insurance, a low
consumption correlation can be rationalised if consumption and leisure are substitutes, fluctuations
are driven by productivity shocks and agents are “on” their elastic labour supply schedules (during
a domestic boom, agents work harder and hence require relatively high consumption as
compensation), as shown by Devereux et al. (1992). However, these restrictions are unlikely to be
valid for the Irish economy.IRISH DIVERSIFICATION 45
 Table 6: International Consumption and Output Correlations II
1973-98 1973-86 1987-98
(1) Cor(C,Y) 0.55 0.56 0.56
(2) Cor(Y,YEU15) 0.08 –0.04 0.20
(3) Cor(C,CEU15) 0.29 0.66 –0.36
(4) Cor(Y,YEMU) 0.05 0.01 0.08
(5) Cor(C,CEMU) 0.22 0.68 –0.39
(6) Cor(Y,YUK) 0.10 –0.13 0.35
(7) Cor(C,CUK) 0.27 0.33 0.08
(8) Cor(Y,YUS) 0.16 0.13 0.43
(9) Cor(C,CUS) 0.29 0.30 0.41
Note: Correlations of log first differences of consumption and output at 1991 PPP exchange
rates.
Data Source: OECD Analytical Database.
measures output and consumption on the basis of 1991 PPP values.5 Although
available for fewer countries, these data enable us to calculate correlations for
the 1990s period.
In row (1) of Table 5, for informational purposes, we report the domestic
correlation between consumption and output. In rows (2) and (3), following
Obstfeld (1995), we report the international output and consumption correlations
between Ireland and a “rest of the world” comprising all countries in the Penn
World Tables with continuous data over 1950-90 that is of quality C- or better
(in all cases, we exclude Ireland from the aggregate). In rows (4) and (5), the
correlations are between Ireland and the EU15 consisting of all current members
of the European Union. In rows (6) and (7), we consider only the EU12 which is
the set of EU member countries prior to the 1996 enlargement; and, in rows (8)
and (9), the eleven founding members of EMU.6 Last, in rows (10)-(13), we
calculated the correlations between Ireland and two key partner countries (UK
and US).
Over the full 1951-90 period, the EMU group is the only case in which the
consumption correlation falls substantially below the output correlation: even
then the difference is small (0.237 versus 0.294). However, this hides a major
change between 1951-72 and 1973-90. During the earlier period, the output
correlation was in all cases above the consumption correlation whereas the
5. Table 6 refers to total output and consumption (population data are not yet available for the
late 1990s for some countries). This makes little difference: we are looking at correlations of annual
fluctuations — population growth does not contribute much to fluctuations since the variation around
its trend would be minimal compared to the variation of output or consumption around their trends.
6. The EMU group is the EU15 minus Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the United Kingdom.46 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
opposite is true for the more recent period. This is especially striking since the
output correlation in all cases actually declined between 1951-72 and 1973-90.
Perhaps the most spectacular case is with respect to the EMU group. Although
the output correlation fell from 0.39 to 0.32 between 1951-72 and 1973-90, the
consumption correlation sharply increased from 0.09 to 0.48. The correlations
of Irish and UK output and consumption growth rates also show a dramatic
change. During the earlier period, the output correlation was higher than the
consumption correlation (0.55 versus 0.29). In the latter period, the output
correlation was almost zero and the consumption correlation was significantly
higher than the output correlation (0.26 versus 0.08). A qualitatively similar
pattern is also found for the US, with the consumption correlation rising above
the output correlation in the 1973-90 period.
In Table 6, we turn to the correlations based on OECD PPP-adjusted data. In
the first data column, the period is 1973-98 and we look at the sub-periods
1973-86 and 1987-98 in the second and third data columns. For the full 1973-98
period, we again have the result that the consumption correlation exceeds the
output correlation for each comparator group, in line with the findings in
Table 5. However, it is evident that this pattern breaks down for the most recent
sub-period 1987-98: the consumption correlations with the EU15 and EMU
groups turn negative, the consumption correlation with the UK is almost zero
and is most positive with respect to the US (both absolutely and relative to the
output correlation).7 One interpretation is that consumption deviations over
such a short time interval are unimportant. Another is that a permanent shift
in output performance, as has plausibly happened in Ireland in recent years,
can lead to a delinking of home and foreign consumption growth rates. This is
the case if a country is not fully locked in to ex ante risk-sharing contracts so
that it can permanently raise its consumption in the case of a permanent income
shock. That said, it would be interesting to see if the 1987-98 pattern persists
in future years.
This consideration notwithstanding, the overall pattern in Tables 5 and 6
clearly places Ireland in a rare set of countries for which the international
consumption correlation tends to be higher than the output correlation — the
usual case is the so-called “quantity anomaly” by which output is more highly
correlated internationally than consumption (see Backus et al., 1995) — and
suggests that Ireland has limited consumption risk to a greater extent than
many other industrial countries. Moreover, the higher cross-country consumption
correlation post-1973 is also consistent with the sharp increase in the degree to
which Ireland is integrated into global capital markets since that time.
7. It is worth noting that the strongest output correlation is typically with the US across Tables
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However, such correlation tests are only an indirect method of examining the
extent of international risk-sharing, since they do not reveal the mechanisms
by which consumption and output are delinked. For instance, agents can in
principle share risk by writing cross-insurance contracts which specify payoffs
that are contingent on GDP realisations, by building internationally-diversified
portfolios, via the overseas investment activities of firms or by international
lending and borrowing. In the next section, we consider a more direct test of one
particular mechanism — a contingent yield on the stock of net foreign assets —
in hedging domestic production risk.
IV  ARE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INCOME FLOWS
STABILISING?
To investigate the cyclical behaviour of yields on net foreign assets, we take
the following approach. Write GNP as
   GNPt = GDPt + NFIt (2)
where NFIt denotes net factor income. Equation (2) can be rewritten as
   GNPt = GDPt + Rt *NFAt (3)
where Rt is the yield on net foreign liabilities in year t and NFAt is the stock of
net foreign assets. NFAt is a predetermined variable since it depends on the
lagged cumulative value of prior current account surpluses. Accordingly, the








If a country (e.g. Ireland) has negative net foreign assets (NFAt <0), it follows
that    ¶Rt / ¶GDPt > 0 is required for GNP to respond less than one-for-one to
the GDP shock.8
Our next step is to empirically investigate whether the yield on net foreign
8. Following Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996), Sorensen and Yosha (1998) and Lane (1999),
we implicitly assume GDP is driven by a univariate stochastic process in reduced form. We do not
attempt to decompose GDP fluctuations into constituent shocks (technology, taste, fiscal, monetary).
A focus on a univariate stochastic process is a common simplifying technique in many quantitative
business cycle models. Note that smoothing would be achieved via a countercyclical yield if a country
had positive net foreign assets.48 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
liabilities is indeed pro-cyclical in Ireland. Since unit root tests reveal the yield
and GDP to be non-stationary variables, we must filter the data to ensure
stationarity.9 Accordingly, we employ the empirical specification
   DRt =a+b*Dlog(GDPt) + et (5)
In Equation (3), D denotes a filtered measure, Rt is the yield on net foreign
liabilities in year t, GDPt is an output indicator, et is an error term and b>0 is
required for the yield to be pro-cyclical. For robustness, we consider three cyclical
filters: (a) the first-difference filter; (b) the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) HP filter;
and (c) the Baxter-King band-pass filter. The first-difference filter in essence
captures cyclical variation around a constant long-run growth rate, whereas
the HP filter allows the trend to be time-varying. Baxter and King (1994) criticise
the HP filter for placing an excessive weight on high-frequency fluctuations in
calculating the filtered component and propose instead a band-pass filter that
focuses on the frequencies that matter for business cycle analysis.10
Under risk sharing, the yield on net foreign liabilities Rt should move pro-
cyclically. A pro-cyclical yield means that, holding fixed the stock of net foreign
liabilities, net payments to overseas investors rise during a boom and fall during
a recession. In this way, domestic production risk is hedged: in exchange for
sharing the fruits of an upturn by paying out a larger share to outside investors,
domestic agents are cushioned against a downturn since the share of domestic
output allocated to foreigners declines under those conditions. Similarly,
investing in overseas assets that have a high payoff when the domestic economy
is doing badly insulates domestic income from fluctuations in domestic output.
It should be recognised that a contingent yield on net foreign liabilities can
be generated by equity-type investments (FDI or portfolio investment in stock
markets) or via investments that promise a fixed income stream in a given
currency. In the latter case, real exchange rate movements convert the fixed
income stream in one currency into a time-varying real return in another
currency. The importance of FDI in the Irish economy suggests that the yield is
unlikely to be invariant, since profit rates fluctuate. However, it remains to be
seen whether investment income flows co-move in such a way with domestic
GDP to provide stabilisation. Unfortunately, the Irish data do not permit us to
compare across different asset classes to explore whether there are indeed
systematic differences in their income-hedging properties.
9. The Phillips-Perron unit root shows both are I(1) variables. For the yield, I(2) can be rejected
at 5 per cent level. For GDP, I(2) can be rejected at the 10 per cent level.
10. In practice, as explained by Baxter (1995), the band-pass filter can be implemented by adjusting
the smoothing parameter in the Hodrick-Prescott filter from 100 to 10 (for annual data). See also
Hodrick and Prescott (1997).IRISH DIVERSIFICATION 49
In addition to Equation (5), we also examine the specification
   DRt =a+b*(Dlog(GDPt) -Dlog(GDPt
ROW))+ et (6)
In Equation (6), GDPt
ROW is an output indicator for the “rest of the world” as
proxied by a trade-weighted GDP average over Germany, the United Kingdom
and the United States. We control for the international business cycle since
hedging is only feasible if correlation between domestic and international output
fluctuations is less than one. As a precursor to the estimation, Figure 2 plots
the yield and log(GDP), in first differences. The visual impression of a positive
relationship is striking.
Figure 2: First Differences of Yield and Log(GDP) over 1975-98.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
The econometric results are presented in Table 7. The first-difference filter is
employed in columns (1)-(2); the HP filter in columns (3)-(4); and the band-pass
filter in columns (5)-(6). In columns (1), (3) and (5), the output measure is just
domestic GDP; in columns (2), (4) and (6) it is the cyclical deviation of domestic
GDP from “rest of world” GDP. Finally, columns (3)-(6) contain an AR(1) correction
to control for serial correlation in the residuals. Estimation is by ordinary least
squares, with White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors.
Yield and GDP
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Table 7: Regression Results: Dependent variable is DRt (Filtered Yield)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant –0.01 –0.02 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001
(–0.98) (–1.95) (0.22) (0.30) (0.17) (0.2)
D log(GDP) 0.50 0.42 0.53 0.41 0.43 0.33
(2.44) (2.00) (2.26) (1.76) (2.37) (1.81)
Adj R2 0.263 0.171 0.506 0.440 0.247 0.187
BG-LM 0.57 0.38 0.12 0.07 0.23 0.31
N 2 4 2 4 2 32 32 3 2 3
Period 1975-98 1975-98 1976-98 1976-98 1976-98 1976-98
Note: Dependent variable is the (filtered) yield on net external liabilities. BG-LM is
p-value from Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test. t-statistic in parenthesis.
Across the specifications, the robust finding is that the yield on net foreign
liabilities is significantly pro-cyclical. The estimated effect is quantitatively large:
taking the results in column (1) for illustrative purposes, a one standard deviation
increase in the GDP growth rate increases the yield by 1.5 percentage points.11
The point coefficients are slightly lower when the output measure is the cyclical
deviation from “rest of world” output in columns (2), (4) and (6): the implication
is that yields also have a positive dependence on global conditions. This finding
is intuitive in the context of an export-orientated economy: profit levels are
sensitive to both external and domestic economic conditions. As a robustness
check, we recalculated the yield on the basis of the alternative estimates of the
stock of external liabilities provided by Honohan and Kelly (1997) and obtained
very similar results.12 We also experimented with a trend term in specifications
(1) and (2) but this also made no difference. Finally, the plot in Figure 2 indicates
that the cyclical relationship between yields and output has tightened during
the 1990s: in future work, it will be interesting to see if this pattern persists.
The evidence in Table 7 supports the notion that Irish production risk is at
least partially hedged, since volatility in domestic GDP is offset by pro-cyclical
movements in the yield paid on net external liabilities. Moreover, this finding is
in line with the evidence in Sections II and III that Ireland has extensive gross
11. The standard deviation of GDP growth is 3 per cent. The point coefficient in column (1) of
Table 7 is 0.5 so that a one standard deviation increase in GDP growth translates into a 1.5 per-
centage point (0.03 x 0.5=0.015) increase in the yield. For comparison purposes, the standard
deviation of the first difference of the yield is 2.7 percentage points.
12. Honohan and Kelly (1997) attempt to correct for capital gains and losses on the holdings of
net foreign liabilities by adjusting for the erosion of nominal values caused by domestic and foreign
inflation. We thank Patrick Honohan for generously providing these data.IRISH DIVERSIFICATION 51
foreign assets and liabilities and the international consumption correlation
exceeds the international output correlation. For Canada and the United
Kingdom, Lane (1999) finds that the yields on many categories of foreign assets
and liabilities are acyclical, which may indicate that the Irish performance is
atypical. However, an important exception was that the yield on Canadian FDI
liabilities was found to be significantly pro-cyclical. This is consistent with an
interpretation that views our heavy dependence on FDI as explaining the
stabilising pattern of international investment income flows in the Irish economy
(see also Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 1996).13 It would be desirable to study more
disaggregated data (e.g. gross international investment positions) in the Irish
case but confidentiality issues prevent the Central Statistical Office from
publishing a detailed breakdown of the international investment position. It is
to be hoped that the current IMF effort to improve data on international
investment flows will provide some extra insights into risk-sharing patterns.
Finally, our focus here has been the hedging of cyclical output risk. Inter-
national diversification can also play a role in hedging “trend” risk (long-term
deviations of domestic output from world output) but we lack a sufficient span
of data to investigate this dimension. Diversification is also potentially useful
in stabilising the value of asset portfolios, as opposed to income, but this issue
is beyond the scope of the present study. It would also be interesting to investigate
the co-movements between investment income flows and the factor subcom-
ponents of national output, to identify whether there are differences in the extent
to which fluctuations in labour income and capital income are hedged.
V  CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have taken an initial step in examining international
diversification in the context of the Irish economy. We found substantial evidence
in support of partial hedging of domestic production fluctuations. Our focus
here has been on the positive dimension of this question but future research
should also address the normative issues involved. For instance, it may be useful
to investigate how the advent of EMU alters the optimal pattern of international
diversification — in the absence of the devaluation option, alternative hedging
mechanisms may become yet more important, especially within the euro area.
Finally, an unexplored question is to identify the sources of Irish macro-
economic risk. It would be interesting to learn whether changes in Ireland’s
13. It is possible that part of the negative comovement between net factor income and GDP is
attributable to fluctuations in transfer pricing activity that simultaneously move recorded factor
income outflows and GDP in the same direction. It would be difficult to test this alternative
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commodity, country, trade and FDI patterns have raised or diminished
vulnerability. A related topic is whether domestic fiscal and monetary policies
have amplified or moderated GDP volatility. In Lane (1998), we provided evidence
that fiscal policy has often been inappropriately pro-cyclical. If monetary and
exchange rate policies were similarly destabilizing, the move to EMU may not
necessarily raise the volatility of GDP.14
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